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INTRODUCTION
In 1999 Pope John Paul II (JPII) issued a Letter of His Holiness to Artists (Letter).
In the Letter, he sought to advance a dialogue between practitioners of religion and art
that has existed for two-thousand years. 1 By initiating a renewed dialogue, he hoped to
mingle the world of art and the world of faith that he felt had separated due to a societal
“atmosphere marked by the absence of God and often by opposition to God.” 2 I suggest
the natural representatives to these worlds of faith and art are the theologian and the artist.
I expect that both the theologian and artist engage in their respective worlds of faith and
art for the sake of experiencing it for themselves as well as to offer it as experience for
others. Perhaps this is why JPII declared that, “this dialogue is rooted in the very essence
of both religious experience and artistic creativity.” 3 The purpose of this thesis is to
express how theology conveys elements of religious experience and artistic creativity, as
they need not be considered separate endeavors. A theology of human creativity is an
articulation of religious experience.
“As fruit of an imagination which rises above the everyday,” JPII asserted that art
is, “a kind of bridge to religious experience”. 4 This statement constitutes the foundation
for the central question I will ask and answer: Can the human acts of imagination and
creativity be a legitimate bridge to religious experience? My answer to this question
entails outlining a theology of the human creative process in order to communicate the
bridge to religious experience as humans utilizing their being and moving toward action.

1

John Paul II, Letter of His Holiness to Artists. Vatican website. 1999, www.vatican.va/holy_father/
john_paul_ii/letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_2304, accessed December 3, 2012.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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As JPII acknowledges, “God called man into existence, committing to him [a] task.” 5
The tradition of the creation story, recounted by the pope in his Letter, invests in
humanity the veracity of being and action as constituting the most basic elements of life.
In order to answer the central question I must acknowledge that the process of
human imagination and creativity can be situated within an existing theological landscape.
I suggest nine phases comprise what originates in God’s being and creation and flows
toward human existence and their creation. (Diagram 1) This diagram is of my own
design, yet it depicts major concepts well established in generations of theological
conversation.

This illustration is oversimplified to represent how divine ontology

establishes the human creative process; it is not intended to restrict God to a process. I
selected nine realties or events I consider of prime importance to a theology of art and
placed them in a diagram to aid conceptualization. Some phases are more relevant than
others are to this discussion, but all are positioned sequentially and divided into three
categories: God, creation, and humanity. The first three phases marked by the darkest
shade of blue reflect God’s being and action by way of ontology, imagination (or vision),
and creation. The next two phases represent creation as it is and how it is perceived;
characterized in ontology and aesthetics. The last four phases continue a cycle and flow
where what humanity initiates through their ontology, imagination, and co-creative acts,
results in a new ontology, and another aesthetic. While God is present throughout these
nine phases, the flow of initiative shifts midway from primarily God to primarily human;
as indicated by the lightest shade of blue in the final four phases.

5

Ibid.
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This thesis privileges phases six and seven, human imagination and human creativity.
However, what occurs before and after these two phases (specifically; God’s being,
imagination, and creation) is indispensable to an understanding of how humans mimic
and participate in the artistic process tracing back to the being and action of God.
To establish a “bridge to religious experience”, I begin with ontology for it
constitutes the human person in the likeness of God which suffuses activity. Given the
nature of art as human activity, I progress to the phenomenology of the acting person.
This argues how being and action, parallel imagination and creativity, to institute
religious experience during artistic practice. In this manner, the “bridge to religious
experience” is traversed during imaginative and creative acts, as an expression of
ontology. Then, I discuss relevant themes in the experience of artist Yves Klein as he
exemplifies imagination and creativity. This work is significant because it articulates the
dialogue Letter proposes between theologians and artists.
Approach
My approach to this subject is one of ontology and phenomenology within the
scope of artistry. I address questions such as, what does it mean to be human compared
to God? With the understanding that human existence is a result of God, and humanbeing manifests aspects of God-being because of imago dei, assessing this demonstrates
God as existent creator of humans as existent co-creators. What is it like for God to
imagine and how does human imagination reflect divine being?

From the same

theological perspective that humans resemble an existent creator, in addition to sharing in
existence and action, they can share in His visionary imagination. As I proceed in
answering the above stated questions, I engage Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Contra Gentiles
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and Summa Theologica. Aquinas’ work is a primary source whose ontology proves
helpful in articulating the reality of being that pervades the creative process. Another
significant source is Rollo May, a psychologist. He was one of the first to research and
write about creativity in his discipline of psychology. His book The Courage to Create
offers simple and practical language inspired by theology. 6 May’s work offers an
intermediary viewpoint that incorporates theological and secular thought.
Next, I approach the phenomenon of human creativity, keeping the viewpoint of
being in mind. What is the difference between objects and subjects? What then, is the
relationship of human activity with creation? How might selection in activity derive
from and affect one’s being? What makes creative action personal to the individual? My
concern for being in the midst of creativity derives from a desire to institute a foundation
for the reality that human creative action is co-creation of their being with God’s being. I
rely upon JPII’s (then Cardinal Wojtyla’s) phenomenological writings to suggest humans
contain the capacity for an immaterial theological process that can be experienced within
the process of imagination and creativity.
Due to the idea that actions amounted over a lifetime will free or condemn an
individual upon death and judgment, JPII’s primary phenomenological concern is one of
morality. Nonetheless, I believe his framework is suitable for application to artists in
order to demonstrate theoretically and practically the relationship between existence and
activity. For in his Letter he outlines the distinction between creativity as the shaping of
ones life versus artistic talent. On the one hand he says, “As Genesis has it, all men and
women are entrusted with the task of crafting their own life: in a certain sense, they are to
6

Rollo May, The Courage to Create (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1975), 8. His book is
inspired by and named after Paul Tillich’s ontological book The Courage to Be.
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make of it a work of art, a masterpiece.” 7 On the other hand, in light of the specific
vocation of the artist, “We are speaking not of moulding oneself, of forming one’s own
personality, but simply of actualizing one’s productive capacities, giving aesthetic form
to ideas conceived in the mind.” 8 In this manner, JPII is articulating that artistic choices
are distinguished metaphors for life choices but are not necessarily isolated or irrelevant
to life choices. That is why he concludes his discussion of this topic by asserting, “The
distinction between the moral and artistic aspects is fundamental, but no less important is
the connection between them.” 9 If there is a link between artistic choices and life choices
that could render eternal consequences, then I find no better way for this thesis to honor
this connection than with the Pope’s own words and with his documents of contribution
to morality.
What are some foundational concepts that contribute to religious experience?
Why is religious experience, as it is traditionally understood, optimal, over other kinds of
experience?

How is artistic experience like and un-like religious experience?

To

construct a “bridge to religious experience” I utilize Sandra Schneiders’ work to
articulate what religious experience is and how certain concepts transfer from the
discipline of theology to art. By doing so, I can legitimize JPII’s claim that art is “a kind
of bridge to religious experience.”
Lastly, has there ever been a documented case of an artist maintaining theological
awareness? What I mean by theological awareness in this context begins with the reality
that artistic creativity is triggered by the perception of God’s creation. Subsequently, the
degree to which original ontology was considered and upheld in the co-creative process
7

John Paul II, Letter of His Holiness to Artists.
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
8
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indicates the level of theological awareness. It is this accuracy of interpretation and
intentionality during the co-creative process that is evaluated in the aesthetic of human
crafting.

From the concept of theological awareness, I need to inquire: how is a

theological model of the creative process realistically implemented?

Since I am

considering a practical application of theology that can be felt as religious experience, I
must ask how a religious experience of imagining and creating might be demonstrated?
An approach of practical theology necessitates that I provide evidence that this
theology can be lived and expressed in the artistic process of an artist. There is sufficient
evidence that Yves Klein believed in the innate nature of imagining and creating, for he
made the claim that his artistic creativity was a religious experience and suspected it as a
universal truth for humanity. The artistic career of Yves Klein will therefore serve as a
case study to demonstrate how he embraced the practical and theological elements of art,
as religious experience, for himself and his audience.
Method
I employ an interdisciplinary method in this thesis. I am attempting to incorporate
these disciplines, and place them into an inter-disciplinary dialogue with art. I begin with
ontology because I propose that art is fundamentally ontological. Presupposing nothing
existed before God and God is from which all other things derive then the ontology of
God permeates all that follows including what created humans bring into existence
artistically. I employ ontology as a systematic concept of God’s being, shared and
mimicked in creation. This scheme demonstrates the theological connection between the
God who is and the human who is. Utilizing ontology is, practically speaking, innate,
because when the human subject initiates an artwork their whole being is involved with
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God’s being. Furthermore, loosely defining art as something constructed from existent
materials and therefore making something that did not exist before, we arrive at the
importance of existence. Lastly, as we will find, existence is an integral boundary to
adequately define the experience of imagination as something real but falling short of
actualized existence. For these reasons, I have selected ontology as the most suitable
method to discuss a theology of imagination.
After the being is considered, what follows is the acting agency, for the human
subject has an experience that prompts their artistic initiative and continues through the
duration of their artistic process. Due to subjective experience, phenomenology is taken
as another methodological consideration in order to provide a realistic accounting of how
artistic experience can be likened to religious experience. Phenomenology is relevant to
creative process because both operate with passive and active components. Whether
speaking of religious, artistic, or any experience, there includes the experiences that
befall us and the experiences we seek out. In order to answer questions regarding choices
and actions we must commence with the understanding that they arise from and
contribute to the narrative of the self, known as experience.
Finally, to render these concepts relevant, a case study will be made of French
artist Yves Klein to illustrate how he presented these conceptions in his life and work.
This segment requires we dialogue with the discipline of art. In his utilization of color,
Klein attempted to illustrate his own aesthetic perception of the created world. That
being said, it could be disputed that his religion influenced the insight of his artistic
creativity rather than the innate activity confirming his religion. That Yves Klein was a
devout Catholic does not diminish his credibility to the argument that ontological essence

A Theology of Imagination and Creativity

9

Huseby

plays a critical role in artistry. Rather, I argue that his Catholicism allows us to discuss
this paradigm for reality in the same language.
Significance
The significance of this work includes the dialogue that it achieves between the
practitioners of art and theology. Furthermore, it may contribute to the sub-disciplines of
systematics, aesthetics, and phenomenology. The ultimate intention behind this work,
however, is to have an effect within artistic communities. That it might be able to help
artists conceive and experience their work differently would be a significant consequence.
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that theology, in its most rudimentary form, can
contribute relevant, practical, and pleasurable benefits to persons and society.
Outline
Chapter 1: Imagination in the Human Being, begins with the starting point of
Thomistic ontology. In order to sanction the human imagination as a receptacle for
divine revelation and divine interaction this method examines God-being and humanbeing within the context of the ontology of the created world.

By identifying the

differences in human-being and God-being, I can more accurately construct an awareness
for divinity present in human imagination; and consequently how human-being and Godbeing converge through imagination. I conclude by connecting imagination as part of our
imago dei.
In Chapter 2: Creativity in the Human Acting, I define and discuss creation and

human craftsmanship as similar but different to God’s capacity. I continue with the
phenomenology of creativity. I begin by establishing the difference between object and
subject in the midst of God’s creation so that the artistic attempts of human acting with
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This allows for a discussion on co-creation as a

gateway to religious experience.
Chapter 3: Art as a Bridge to Religious Experience is the final construction of this
thesis. It takes into account the themes of limits and intensity as a way to illustrate how
the ontological nature of the human person unites people. A comparison of religious
versus spiritual experience will be made in an attempt to perform the theological task of
articulating a practical theology.
In Chapter 4: Imagination and Creativity in the Artistic Experience of Yves Klein,
Yves Klein’s display of color attempted to invoke what theologians would describe as its
ontological nature. His devout personal practice of Roman Catholicism and his prolific
artwork challenges those who would suggest that religious tendencies, like tradition or
morality, restrict selection and stifle possibilities in a way that confines imagination and
limits creative output. Klein was inspired by his religion and critics will argue that his
work triumphantly preceded other artists of his time. 10 The connections between his
artistry and theology are palpable, and perhaps intentional. He claimed making art was a
religious experience for him. If an ontological model of imagination and creativity is
innate to artistic practice then Klein demonstrates my point. His notions of “immaterial”
and “sensibility” were indeed revelatory. He endeavored to re-define the purpose of art
itself. Klein’s attempted materialization of the immaterial provides a concrete example
for the differentiated realms of Thomistic existence versus essence that correspond well
to imagination and creativity.

10

For example, almost thirty years after Klein’s concept of the void inspired his invisible painting in the
installation: “Surfaces and Blocks of Pictorial Sensibility. Pictorial Intentions”; famed American artist
Andy Warhol performed a similar stunt in a photograph where he stands in front of his Invisible Sculpture.
See Denys Riout, Yves Klein Expressing the Immaterial (Paris: Éditions Dilecta, 2010), 38, 72.

A Theology of Imagination and Creativity

11

Huseby

CHAPTER 1: IMAGINATION IN THE HUMAN BEING
I suggest the two major steps in the artistic process include imagination, primarily,
and creativity secondarily. This chapter will explore imagination. Yet the creative
process begins two phases prior to imagination. As noted in my diagram (The Landscape
of Theological Creation in 9 Phases, on page 3), phases four and five are essential
precursors and catalysts to imagination, the first phase of the creative process. My notion
of “process” includes pertinent markers within a typical creative process. 11 These
markers include the detailing of phases four to six: the ontology (or reality of being), the
aesthetic (or perception or cognition) of these realities upon encounter, and the interactive,
selective, and limited nature of imagination.
Phase 4: The Ontology of the Created World Including Humans
In this section, I hope to demonstrate that ontology is fundamental to a theology
of art. 12 Phases one to three comprise the being and action of God that parallel the
human artistic process. Beginning at phase four, allows us to explore the being-ness of
humans (and objects) for the subsequent encounter of them in phase five. Discussion of
God’s ontology throughout is necessary because it is where human ontology originates.

11

It is nearly impossible to survey and discuss every point in the creative process because it varies by the
individual artist and their method of expressed form. While I may be excluding some of all that is typical, I
include that which I believe to be most relevant for theological discussion. The reader might note that these
are specific enough to apply to artistic process yet expansive enough to remain pertinent beyond artistic
creation.
12
Not all agree ontology remains a helpful sub-discipline. See for example, Jean-Luc Marion, God without
Being (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). Marion argues the need to abandon the subjectivity of
modernity that has falsely emphasized God as being as the sole source for theology and faith. His
disposition stems from his conviction that theology has become an idol-like obstacle to the true
understanding of God. His post-modern vision is revelation-centered, non-correlational, and postmetaphysical that chooses instead to focus on categories such as: face, excess, gift, goodness, and most
importantly, agape. He suggests these are more conducive to true faith for they require neither deduction
nor legitimation. From his perspective, our theological characterizations of God as reason, being, or moral,
should be under considerable question.
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Most significant to an ontology of humans and objects is that while they derive
from God and may possess an element of God, they are not God. Once God created
objects and human subjects, they became autonomous beings apart from their creator.
Thomas Aquinas’ ontology is useful for substantiating this foundation.

I adopted

Aquinas’s ontology because his theological system articulates and emphasizes existence.
In his chapter on Thomistic ontology, Luis Cortest author of The Disfigured Face, notes
that while Aquinas was neither the first nor the last to distinguish between essence and
existence, his theological system however, “turned existence into the most fundamental
principle for our understanding of reality.” 13 This section examines this “reality” of the
ontology of the created world because it triggers imagination.
In the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas states, “God is his essence or nature.” 14
He is original nature from which all other nature is derived. God is the first and supreme
being, being itself in whom, “the divine essence is predicated.” 15 Summarized another
way, philosopher Thérèse-Anne Druart calls this, “nature of being inasmuch as it is being
without qualification.” 16 As for the being of a human, since “the divine nature is
communicable by likeness…the diversities of forms arise from the fact that things imitate
the divine essence diversely.” 17 With respect to animals or inanimate objects, according
to Aquinas, they possess being also in so much as they exist, yet they do not possess the
same level of divine essence as humanity. The form where divine essence is most

13

Luis Cortest, The Disfigured Face (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 11.
SCG, I, ch. 21, ¶ 1.
15
SCG, I, ch. 21, ¶ 4.
16
Thérèse-Anne Druart, “Averroes on God’s Knowledge of Being Qua Being” in Studies in Thomistic
Theology ed. by Paul Lockey (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas, 1995),
194.
17
SCG, I, ch. 50, ¶ 9.
14
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signified is in humanity18 because Aquinas says, “the essence of a thing is either the thing
itself or is related to the thing… as its cause; for a thing derives its species through its
essence.” 19 Aquinas’ ontological theology declares that in their relational likeness to
God, the human species possesses divine being and that being is their first knowable
object through reason. The commonly used term imago dei (image of God) is another
way to express the ontological reality that humans share in the nature of God. This much
is made clear by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica in writing of how God’s nature and
perfection is shared by others. 20 When speaking of this partaking of being Aquinas
seems to use the terms “participate” and “share” interchangeably. While beings are
different and apart from God, there remains a shared involvement as he asserts, “All
beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation.” 21
Aquinas’ importance of shared divine being corroborates with the notion of imago dei so
it is enough to establish that any experience of human existence is an experience of God.
I will continue in order to elaborate how this further manifests in the artistic process.
In the artistic process, phase four: the ontology of the created world, including
humans, is a precursor and catalyst to imagination. We presupposed God’s existence
then utilized Aquinas to suggest that God’s being-ness is demonstrated in the existence of
creation including humans.

Neither creation nor humans are God but they have

autonomous being-ness from their creator God. In this way, Aquinas sought to explicate
existence as the understanding to our reality. In a reality whose nature derives from God
human likeness to God is to share in His being. Although different and apart from God,

18

SCG, I, ch. 21, ¶ 6.
SCG, I, ch. 21, ¶ 5.
20
ST, I, q. 10, art. III; ST, I, q. 14, art. VI.
21
ST, I, q. 44, art. I.
19
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humans have an involvement or participation with God. Ultimately, this was to stress
that existence is an experience of God.
Now that we have established that humans have being, like that of God, we can
examine one major element of such being, the assessment of other beings outside of ones
being.
Phase 5: The Aesthetic of the Created World
Autonomous beings that can observe their surroundings bring us to phase five: the
aesthetic of the created world. Given that Aquinas states, “Now the nature of man
requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things” 22 this section will explore
perceiving the visible. It begins with definitions of aesthetics as a subject including
theological aesthetics, and a psychological study of art viewing will help us distinguish
between perception and cognition. The bulk of this section relies upon Rollo May’s two
step creative process of encounter and intensity. Encounter introduces us to the reality of
subject-object interaction while intensity can solve two common complications often
resulting from aesthetic encounter. With the aims of aesthetics as the apprehension of
existence and providing a vision for reality it serves as a precursor and catalyst to
imagination.
By aesthetic, I mean the internal human response of perceiving a being. Internal
interaction with the physical world is what summarizes this fifth phase often
characterized by a responsive feeling. According to Richard Viladesau in Theological
Aesthetics, in Greek, aesthetic means anything perceived by the senses, which causes

22

ST I q. 43 a. 7.
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sensation or feeling. 23 The aesthetic viewer however should take care not to become
idolatrous to feeling or forget the ontological source of what is being viewed. 24 In
addition, Viladesau reminds us that the concept of aesthetic varies depending on if the
emphasis is subject-oriented, as in the person having the feeling or object-oriented, as in
the object causing the feeling. 25 To embrace the subject-oriented perspective is to
acknowledge the significance of the ontology of the human subject.
The aesthetic of human crafting is comparable to what is being outlined here as
phase five: the aesthetic of the created world. To aid us in understanding the stages
occurring in a moment of aesthetic viewing, I suggest H. Leder et al’s “A Model of
Aesthetic Appreciation and Aesthetic Judgments,” an influential psychological study that
formulated four stages. The first two stages are passive experiences where “perceptual
analysis” is the automatic intake of features such as color, lines, and contrast. The next
stage of “implicit memory integration” influences the experience when what is viewed
matches with and recalls any memories. The next two stages entail more deliberate
processing where “explicit classification” notices the artwork by its content such as
objects or people. The final stage where lasting judgments and feelings derive is also,
where “cognitive mastering and evaluation” evokes an interpretation from personal
history and/or art related knowledge. Next, evaluation of all determines whether or not
meaning and understanding is consistent with what is being viewed. 26 I offer this study
for two reasons: First, because it helps us in defining and distinguishing the difference
23

Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 6. While beauty, taste, and its exclusive application to the fine arts are often
associated with the study of aesthetics, those notions fall outside the scope of this thesis.
24
Ibid., 10, 20.
25
Ibid., 8.
26
H. Leder, B. Belke, A. Oeberst, & D. Augustin, “A Model of Aesthetic Appreciation and Aesthetic
Judgments” British Journal of Psychology 95 (2004), 489–508.
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between perception and cognition. Perception is an automatic reception of sensory data,
whereas cognition is a focused effort of thinking resulting in judgment. Secondly, I
suggest that the stages outlined by Leder et al apply to what occurs when humans
experience the created world because that experience provokes imagination.
Everyday humans view the visual surroundings of the created world, from the
subtle features of colors and lines, registering and triggering memories, to the assessment
of people and objects.

Rarer however is the final stage of cognitive mastery and

evaluation where focused attention seeks meaning and understanding. Discovering and
articulating religious meaning in the created world defines theological aesthetics for
Viladesau identifies it as, “Considering God, religion, and theology in relation to sensible
knowledge arising from sensation, imagination, and feeling, and the arts.” 27 To observe
the existence of our surroundings is to begin to understand reality.
According to Rollo May, how a person engages with what they experience in their
outside world bears a strong influence on their imaginative and creative endeavors.
While he is not utilizing “aesthetics” by name, years of analyzing artists has led May to
describe the artistic creative process as beginning with a moment of encounter.
Encounter elucidates how an artist observing their outside world is moved to artistry, so
what is seen is incorporated into their work.. 28 The artistic creative process of Rollo May
has two parts: encounter and intensity. 29
For May, encounter, initiates the creative process, and it includes two entities:
subject and object. 30 Objects comprising the world affect our tendencies, “Creativity is

27

Viladesau, 11.
May, 41.
29
Ibid., 40-54.
30
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the encounter of the intensively conscious human with his or her world,” 31 May says.
He continues to outline the complexity:
World has objective reality, to be sure, but it is not simply that. World is
interrelated with the person at every moment. A continual dialectical
process goes on between world and self and self and world; one implies
the other, and neither can be understood if we omit the other. This is why
we can never localize creativity as a subjective phenomenon; one can
never study it simply in terms of what goes on within the person. What
occurs is always a process, a doing—specifically a process interrelating
the person and his or her world. 32
May holds an artist’s relationship with their objects in balance, for artist and object affect
one another. Chapter two will explore the subject-object interaction in greater detail. As
for now, this will be important to understand the eventual transition between the
imaginative and creative phase.

More than just experience occurs when a subject

interacts with an object, encounter causes change. When an artist’s vision begins due to
an experience of objects, this inspires and changes how they experience objects like paint,
clay, instruments, and paper. Similarly, these objects aid in transforming the subject
handling them.
As outlined here, an aesthetic of the created world suggests that upon encounter of
objects feelings emerge that compel imagination and creativity.

However, two

complications can arise in a moment of aesthetic viewing; dis-unity of vision and
mistaking the origin of vision. The first pertains to the subject-object interaction and its
basis is explained by phenomenologist Violetta Waibel who says, “the imagination
produces a unity of subject and object” 33 for there needs to be a kind of authenticity to
fantastical ideas and/or a possible practicality to permit imagination to translate to
31
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creativity. May points out the necessity of this unity otherwise; the complication arises,
where the expressed creativity based on the encounter with the objective world does not
appear to accurately portray reality:
The trouble begins whenever anyone dogmatically sets himself or herself
up to defend either extreme. On the one hand, when an individual insists
on his or her own subjectivity and follows exclusively his or her own
imagination, we have a person whose flights of fancy may be interesting
but who never really relates to the objective world. When, on the other
hand, an individual insists that there is nothing “there” except empirical
reality, we have a technologically minded person who would impoverish
and oversimplify his or her and our lives. Our perception is determined by
our imagination as well as by the empirical facts of the outside world. 34
As Waibel and May just articulated when phases nine and five do not match, there
is an issue of authenticity for there is not a unity of vision. At the beginning of this
section I compared phases five and nine not simply to correlate observational methods.
Rather, because an artist is observing the world and expressing their judgment, a person
observing an artist’s work critiques the artist’s observation and judges the expressed
vision in the artwork. Disagreement from the viewer about the artist’s portrayal is the
result of a dis-unity of vision. 35
Whereas the first complication is a disunity of vision arising from the subjectobject interaction, the second complication stems from the inability to distinguish to
whom the vision is attributed to ontologically.

For the sake of this thesis, I am

oversimplifying the true nature of the aesthetic of the created world phase. I articulate it,
34
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in its most basic form as the challenge to see God’s creation and re-articulate it. What
actually occurs is that humans are observing a mixture of God’s creation and human
creation during this phase. Due to these various visions, it can be difficult to clearly
identify authorship. A difference of vision origin marks the difference in ontological
origin that is being articulated or viewed in an artwork. For better or worse, whether
from God or a human, perception is often misattributed to its proper origin. Therefore,
the transition from observed reality to subjective reaction provokes countless
discrepancies in the unity of vision.
This is where May’s second part of the creative process is important: intensity.
For May, intensity amounts to the passion, depth, and commitment a person is willing to
engage in during the encounter. 36 He insists, “absorption, being caught up in, wholly
involved, and so on, are all used commonly to describe the state of the artist when
crafting.

By whatever name one calls it, genuine creativity is characterized by an

intensity of awareness.” 37 He also uses the term ecstasy because he says, “ex-stasis
means ‘to stand out from,’ to be freed from the usual split between subject and object.”38
Presumably, the more committed a person is to an aesthetic encounter the more likely
they are to properly perceive the ontology to be found there, a vision that if duplicated in
an artwork, should find agreement among viewers. In this way, May agrees with Waibel
that unity of subject and object is a necessary step in the creative process.

36

Ibid., 44-48.
Ibid., 44.
38
Ibid., 48.
37

A Theology of Imagination and Creativity

20

Huseby

Our human intention for imagination and creativity originates from what we see. 39
In his Letter, JPII states, “[God] created the human being to whom he subjected the
visible world as a vast field in which human inventiveness might assert itself.” 40 When
appropriated to this fifth phase, JPII’s statement confirms that the ontology of the person
is engaging with the ontology of an object or other person. Like May, encounter is also
an important starting point but JPII favors the term cognition. The following passage
cautions against an overly subjective oriented aesthetic where a person creates their own
reality, “cognition does not in any way create ‘reality’ (cognition does not create its own
content), but arises thanks to the various kinds of [being], thanks to the enormous
richness and complexity of reality.” 41 In other words, humans take in reality, they do not
generate it. This is an important point, that apprehending existence offers a vision of
reality. JPII goes on to say, “If reality were identical with cognition, then the necessity of
cognition to tend toward the truth would be completely unintelligible.” 42 It is because we
are not certain of things that we search outside of ourselves to know things certainly.
Although we seek unity, we are not “one” with other beings or objects otherwise we
could not be directed toward them. 43
The created world provides the content for imagination once that aesthetic is
perceived by an artist. This section helped us to understand the rudimentary role of
intense cognition in theological aesthetics; to find God in what is viewed. The creative
process of Rollo May, introduced the subject-object change that occurs in a subject-
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object interaction the concepts of which will figure more prominently in the next chapter.
Following encounter, intensity helped us resolve two complications that often arise
because of aesthetic encounter and it relied heavily upon vision, which was established in
the previous chapter. Ultimately, to apprehend existence provides a vision of reality that
is re-articulated in the artistic processes of imagination and creativity.
Now that phases four and five have established the precursors and catalysts of
ontological reality and aesthetics, the next two phases, compose the creative process of
imagination and creativity.
Phase 6: Humans Imagine
The exploration of phase four and five culminates here, in phase six, to support
human imagination as a receptacle for divine disclosure and interaction. For this reason,
Aquinas’ ontological method will aid in distinguishing the notions of being God and
being human. By identifying the differences between human-being and God-being I will
isolate divinity present in human imagination and consequently, the convergence of
human-being and God-being through imagination.
Imagination is to envision something not yet known or actualized tangibly. In my
framework of imagination what is not yet known amounts to knowledge of essence and
what is not yet actualized tangibly is existence. I begin with the ontological link to
knowledge then continue with the ontological reality of essence and existence because
my major point is that due to its ontological nature, imagination is interactive through
selection. I attempt to demonstrate how imagination is selective and why selection is
theologically significant.
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Since my intended definition of imagination is to envision something not yet
known or actualized tangibly, it is necessary to illustrate the knowledge of God and the
knowledge of humanity. To Aquinas, ontology has a profound link to knowledge. When
conveying God’s knowledge of humans he writes, “He knows the nature of being through
a knowledge of Himself.” 44 If God can know His self, any part of himself instilled in
another is still known to him. 45 This is simple deduction and it should work both ways,
by humans knowing their nature they can know God.

This is how imagination is

interactive. Yet in this interactivity, in light of human choice, can God know what is not,
never has been, nor will be in reality? Humans can, for this is the obvious character of
imagination. It is significant that humans can represent something in the mind without
giving it form or bringing it into actuality. How Aquinas answers the question at hand
illustrates how intangible imagination differs from created actuality. The difference lay
in how Aquinas distinguishes essence versus existence. He shows this by distinguishing
how we can know what something is and still know something that does not actually
exist.46 He believes both essence and existence are a form of being, yet they differ in
human visibility or degree of knowledge. When speaking of God he states, “His Essence
can be represented by many things that are not, nor will be, nor ever were.” 47
Imagination works in the arena of essences, which are concepts that are alive but
intangible and possibly non-existent.

While both essence and existence live, only

existence lives in a tangibly actualized sense. From this, we can redefine imagination: it
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is a knowledge of an essence that may or may not have come into existence as a tangible
actualization. In fact, it is only because a concept lives elsewhere, intangibly, as essence,
that it can be conceived by the human imagination and cross over into actuality through
the act of creativity.
Aquinas says, “The things that are present, past, or future to us God knows in His
power. The knowledge of such things is said to be a knowledge of vision.” 48 On this
basis, I suggest that knowledge, vision, and imagination subsist equally and are
interchangeable in the sense that they are of the same import. Another passage from
Aquinas suggests knowledge is equivalent to imagination. He offers the metaphor of an
artist to depict how God can know what is not yet in the same way that an artist knows
what is not yet in his or her work:
Again, the knowledge of the divine intellect is to other things as the
knowledge of an artisan to artifacts, since through His knowledge God is
the cause of things. Now, the artisan knows through his art even those
things that have not yet been fashioned, since the forms of his art flow
from his knowledge to external matter for the constitution of the
artifacts. 49
This is a contextual way for Aquinas to state, “The knowledge of the maker determines
the form for the thing made.” 50 To re-iterate, the form of artwork flows from knowledge
or imagination and this inspires the manipulation of matter.

This is cohesive with

previous statements about encounter influencing the role of imagination. The more
encounter we have the more our knowledge increases, the greater our degree of
knowledge, the larger our scope of vision. 51 The significance of God as pure knowledge,
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means the more pure knowledge humans have the more they are consistent with God’s
vision. God has a knowledge of all that is actual in tangible reality and all that is
potential within human power. However, humans can know much of what is actual and
only some of what is potential. 52 In this way, imagination is often incomplete compared
to the known choices God has knowledge of. This is how imagination is selective. God
knows all that humans have, could ever, and never imagined. Human imagination is
therefore not original thought, merely selection of possibilities coming to be known to the
individual or the human race, from the ultimate divine intellect of God. Imagination is
selecting among real and alive essences for the likely sake of actualization and existence.
Although May’s starting point is more psychological than theological, he would
seem to agree with my assessment that knowledge, vision, and imagination are equivalent
concepts as he illustrates, “Imagination is the outreaching of mind… It is the capacity to
‘dream dreams and see visions’ to consider diverse possibilities before ones attention.”53
Since knowledge, vision, and imagination are equivalents, their manifestation in humans
differs in

comparison to God. Keeping in mind an extension of May’s notion of

encounter, “Receptivity is the artist’s holding him or herself alive and open, alert to see
whatever can be glimpsed when the vision come[s].” 54 As he acknowledges, being open
to an array of possibilities can be overwhelming. A human cannot know all possibilities
nor can they act them out. From May’s psychological point of view, “Consciousness is
the awareness that emerges out of the dialectical tension between possibilities and
Creative Across Time? An Executive Interpretation of the Serial Order Effect in Divergent Thinking
Tasks” in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts Vol. 6 No. 4 2012, 309–319. Their study
concludes that people deliver output that is more imaginative over time not because they jump to remote
ideas but because a duration of time permits an increase in information stimulating their imaginative
faculties. They assert that retrieval and manipulation of knowledge allows for higher creative productivity.
52
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limitations.”55 More than the shaping of the mind, limitations contribute to the health of
the mind, a careful balance is needed, “As imagination gives vitality to form, form keeps
imagination from driving us into psychosis. This is the ultimate necessity of limits,” 56 he
says. The selective nature of imagination is essential because humans are limited, and in
turn, require limits.
Aquinas arrives at this conclusion through ontology, “the essence of God is of an
infinite perfection, whereas every other thing has a limited being and perfection, it is
impossible that the universe of things other than God equal the perfection of the divine
essence.” 57 Commenting in The Creative Retrieval of St. Thomas Aquinas on the
interactive nature of Aquinas’ essence-existence doctrine W. Norris Clarke affirms for us,
“This is a participation doctrine.” 58 He elaborates, “It is a doctrine both of creatures and
of God in their mutual relations, the central vantage point from which he views all
creatures as participating in limited fashion through their respective essences in the
unlimited plenitude of God’s own perfection.” 59 Imagination deriving from our divine
nature means humans have an incomplete connection to God who is complete divine
nature. Yet it amounts to a potential for interaction nonetheless, a person can strengthen
this connection but need not establish it because the connection already exists by human
nature. Although Clarke does not say the following in the context of imagination, he
remains helpful in offering that with respect to humans, “essence, in its turn, becomes
nothing but the interior limiting principle,”
55
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participation” 61 to convey the proper theological reality present in a capacitated though
restricted human.
In the context of imagination, while it can and does surpass what exists in reality,
our limitedness prevents us from exceeding all the possible essences that amount to the
full imagination of God. Imagination as part of our divine nature allows us to envision
greater possibility than current reality may convey but what we actualize is always an
abbreviated form of divine essence. In other words, a limited being will perform in a
limited fashion, which in the context of imagination is the requirement to select for the
sake of creative formation.
In summary, during imagination, divine interaction of a human with God is the
arrival into realms of knowledge from a previous state of unknowing. As a result,
imagination must be selective because humans by their nature are more limited than God,
and are not capable of being open to all of the knowledge God is capable of. No matter
how deep or vast, human knowledge is always incomplete. Nevertheless, however close
to reality as potential future or however far from reality as impractical fantasy, imagining
diverse possibilities exercises our capacity for divine-human convergence. Furthermore,
the reason imagination is selective is due to the receptivity within their limited nature.
Encounter with nature or any humanly actualized essence is engagement with a sense of
God’s being from the myriad of potential essences awaiting actualization.

Divine

disclosure in the human being then appears in the realm of essences. For this purpose, I
defined knowledge, vision, and imagination as equivalent terms as they all pertain to real,
alive, essences that may or may not have transitioned from God’s exclusive enclosure,
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disclosed to the realm humans consider existence. Within this framework, an act must
precede an existence so we turn to the second phase of the creative process.
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CHAPTER 2: THE CREATIVITY OF HUMAN ACTION
Phase 7: Human Creativity as Crafting/Co-Creation
JPII says in his Letter, “None can sense more deeply than you artists, some echo
of the mystery of creation with which God, the sole creator of all things, has wished in
some way to associate you.” 62 This association I regard as co-creation. After defining
terms I present a kind of subject-oriented asthetic where the artist as crafter is under
consideration. The concept of phenomenology is an integral approach to this chapter
because whether in a moment of active action or passive being, we are having an
experience. This chapter continues the theme of the previous one because the ontological
nature of imagination contributes to the phenomenological action of creativity. The
selection of imagined ideas illustrates our freedom while the actualization of creativity
solidifies its concretezation. In the midst of the artistic process the artist affects their self
and objects around them to create a new ontology. Although humans possses free-will in
activity, they are limited, and dependent on God. In the same way they share nature and
vision with God, they also share action with God. As JPII reminds us, “the human
mirrors the image of God as Creator.” 63
Imagination is arguably an action, but it is one hidden in the mind of an artist
since it does not actualize tangibly which I consider a condition for activity. 64 As such, I
define creativity as action oriented for it is at its root an activity. An artist’s creativity is
often measured not by how much one envisions something intangibly but in how much
62
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they configure and construct that vision with materials. Creativity is an act that results in
a manifestation in reality; it is the actualizing of an essence into existence.
JPII’s concern for subject and object stems from his pronouncement that man is a
subjective object whose subjective individuality should not be lost in theological
articulation. JPII believes that for the human subject identity is guaranteed through
existence and activity. 65 By activity, he aligns with May the psychologist, in recognizing
that interactions with objects affect the human self. Yet with JPII’s theology, he wants
personal aspects within the subjective person to be encompassed in phenomenology
rather than making generalities of the human species. 66 Otherwise, phenomenology is
broad, impersonal, and devoid of originality. It is not enough to consider a person as a
being capacitated for action while ignoring the personal nature of being and action.
Viladesau is helpful here in offering two dimensions of humans as imago dei between,
“(1) the permanent ‘structural’ qualities of human nature that make possible, and (2) the
actual reception of God’s self revelation and assimilation to God’s way of being.” 67 I
offer this here to elaborate on JPII’s point that while a human being with divine likeness
is capacitated, they control how much they actualize that capacity. For this reason, JPII
seeks to provide a fuller picture of what it means to be and act human individualistically
as this constitutes our worth. 68 His study of man, “by approaching him through action”69
is encapsulated in The Acting Person. This is helpful to our discussion because the
ontological nature of imagination is related to the phenomenological action of creativity.
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In The Acting Person, JPII begins with human action in order to understand the
relationship between activity and existence.

His study represents the impact

phenomenology has on ontology and vice versa. Firstly, let us examine phenomenology.
By phenomenology, I mean human experience that has active, passive, subjective, and
objective qualities. Sometimes we have an experience because we have made something
happen with our actions, and the experience is actively subjective. Other times, that
experience occurs due to circumstances beyond our control, we are objectified in
passivity. This is not to say that experience cannot contain a combination of both. We
might say, for example, that the aesthetic encounter occurring in phase five happens to us
as passive objects until we initiate an action with phase six or seven, imagination or
creativity. JPII defines experience as possessing both subjective and objective quality:
The first element of experience can be defined as a “sense of reality”,
placing the accent on reality—on the fact that something exists with an
existence that is real and objectively independent of the cognitizing
subject and the subject’s cognitizing act, while at the same time existing as
the object of the act. Because of this, the structural whole of experience
also contains a second element, which can be defined as a “sense of
knowing”. 70
This passage recalls the encountering and the cognition I treated in chapter one as well as
providing a suitable foundation to a subject oriented aesthetic.
Since a person is a subject and object, an action affects both aspects of the person.
JPII states, “Through the mechanism of the basic ontological structure… this is the
reason why the human being, even while he is the agent in acting, still remains its
metaphysical subject. He is both the actor and transcendent subject.” 71 For JPII, even in
the midst of purposeful action two complementary elements include the initiating active
70
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capacity that still maintain an observational quality from ones being. He says that “the
integration of the person in the action” and the “transcendence of the person in action”
creates a dynamic “person-action whole”. 72
A connection between ontological existence and activity is also articulated by JPII
and is expressed in the phrase operari sequitur esse 73 (operation follows being). The act
of being affects the activity of the person and vice versa, it is a process of disclosure. In
other words, we can come to know more about (being) esse by way of (action) operari.
He explains that it is ultimately “the freedom proper to the human person [that] is
simultaneously expressed and concretized.” 74 To put this into the context of artistry,
freedom is analogous to our selection in imagination and concretization is analogous to
the actualization of crafting something. The artistic process permits expression of ideas
while also maintaining personal freedom to choose for the sake of identity
communication and solidification.
This exploration of the subject-object interaction upon encounter, affecting the
self and objects through action, offers the detail to what May asserts when he concurs of
artists, “Their creativity is the most basic manifestation of a man or woman fulfilling his
or her own being in the world.” 75 In crafting actions, an artist also actualizes a part of
themselves. JPII applies his theology more specifically to creativity, “The artist not only
summons his work into being, but also in some way reveals his own personality by means
of it. [For the artist] art offers both a new dimension and an exceptional mode of
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expression for his spiritual growth.” 76 In the artistic process, man is called to transform
himself and his outside world, as JPII also writes, “Through his ‘artistic creativity’ man
appears more than ever ‘in the image of God’, and he accomplishes this task above all in
shaping the wondrous ‘material’ of his own humanity and then exercising creative
dominion over the universe which surrounds him.” 77 Moments of creativity change the
objects crafted as well as the one doing the crafting.
Up to this point, I have spoken primarily of the human subject in the notion of
change where more than just the human subject is changed, so are the objects. As such,
more should be said about what I intend theologically when I speak of objects. Aquinas
would articulate objective reality as, “there is consequently nothing in any thing that is
not caused by God, mediately or immediately.” 78 That God created the pure objects or
the materials that constitute manufactured objects is significant to being that stems from
acting. The former Pope says it well when he states, “The one who creates bestows being
itself, he brings something out of nothing. The craftsman, by contrast, uses something
that already exists, to which he gives form and meaning.” 79 From this, we discover three
things. First and obviously, is that there is a difference in the tasks between beings, the
creator verses the craftsman. In the strictest theological sense, to create is reserved for
God alone, and humans merely re-arrange, re-order, or craft.

Human creativity is

ultimately craftsmanship. The second is the dependency humans have on God for their
material selection. The third, though more subtle inference, is that the esse behind the
creative act along with the esse of the object influences the esse that emerges. The
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encounter with objects that led to selection in imagination and its tangible actualization in
creativity results in a change in the participating subject and the object it is directed
toward. The ontology is significant to both. The same art supplies will not craft the same
outcome if two different artists use them, similarly, we cannot craft the same outcome if
we utilize different art supplies. “The greatness of a poem or a painting,” writes May, “is
not that it portrays the thing observed or experienced, but that it portrays the artist’s or
the poet’s vision cued off by his encounter with reality. Hence [it is] unique, original,
never to be duplicated.” 80
This quote from May helps us to further conclude the new ontology that emerges
as a result of an artist’s engagement with created reality. If we take seriously, what JPII
has said about the artist’s self imbued and revealed in their artwork, then any creative act
alters objects to such a degree that it modifies its ontology. If it were not for this
inevitable shift in ontology, this impossible task of perfectly replicating that which an
artist encounters, they would not feel so haunted according to May. He notes from
studying artists, “Anxiety is related to the gap between the ideal vision that the artist is
trying to paint and the objective results.” 81 It is as though through creativity, the human
is always destined to change their outside world, but never to the fullest extent of the
vision they intend. On the other extreme, May explains the disproportionate joy that
occurs as creativity takes form, “I propose that this is the experience of this-is-the-waythings-are-meant-to-be. If only for that moment, we participate in the myth of creation.
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Order comes out of disorder, form out of chaos, as it did in the creation of the
universe.” 82
Leaving off on that statement about creation, finally, I have laid the foundation
for establishing co-creation. In the previous chapter we accounted for God being pure
being which substantiated humans as being by participation. I articulated the reality of
co-nature.

I said that God was pure essence and non-actualized essences is the

characteristic feature of imagination.

Similarly, God as pure knowledge, which we

equated with vision, is also participatory as far as an instance of selections in imaginative
vision. This articulated the possibility for a sense of co-vision. Since imagination is for
the likely sake of actualization in existence, I continue to argue how participation through
an act of creativity articulates a sense of co-creation.
As he was crucial in providing structure for God-being and human-being, I return
to Aquinas to deliver foundations for God-act and human-act. To Aquinas, “God is pure
act.” 83 As for human acts, “Each thing acts in so far as it is in act. Therefore, what is not
wholly act acts, not with the whole of itself, but with part of itself. But what does not act
with the whole of itself is not the first agent, since it does not act through its essence but
through participation in some thing.” 84 By Aquinas’ estimation as with being, humans
act only by participating in God.
However, by virtue of shared action or participation, it would be easy to attribute
too much emphasis upon God, for what is not wholly God. For this reason, Aquinas is
certain to articulate the nature of free-will, “Free choice is said in relation to the things
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that one wills, not of necessity, but of his own accord.” 85 While God participates in
human action, he does not compel it, action is committed by human choice. Phrased
another way, Aquinas places humans as masters of their acts who are nevertheless,
dependent upon God, “because he has free choice, man is said to be master of his acts.
But this supremely befits the first agent, whose act does not depend on another.” 86 So
while the term co-creation may emphasize the divine power of God’s creation ability, this
power is nonetheless wielded by humans during acts of crafting, artistic or otherwise.
The experience of power through action that affects our humanity is articulated by
May, “A man or woman becomes fully human only by his or her choices and his or her
commitment to them. People attain worth and dignity by the multitude of decisions they
make from day to day.” 87 Yet May also calls our attention to limitations. Earlier, we
said that human beings have limits and so do human actions. As far as imagination is
concerned, limitation is due to the selective nature of imagination. With respect to action,
limitation extends to selection, as there are only so many action combinations to select
from, but given the actualizing nature of action, limitation also extends to objects with
which one interacts with. In the context of artistic creativity, there are only so many
materials, colors, and techniques to create with. We recall that creativity is more often
than not a re-arranging or re-ordering of only that which God can create. There is much
humans will never create because we do not possess the God provided material means.
This is dependency at work. May tells us that, “Creativity itself requires limits, for the
creative act arises out of the struggle of human beings with and against that which limits
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them.” 88 Limits are required because they indicate that actualization has taken place,
otherwise, we cannot by virtue of the definition call it creativity. May articulates this
well, “I can, therefore, understand the rebellion in our day against form and limits as
expressed in the cry ‘We have unlimited potentialities.’ But when these movements try
to throw form or limits out entirely, they become self-destructive and noncreative.” 89
That is to say, when nothing is committed to there is no act of true creativity.
In this section, JPI’s phrase operari sequitur esse (operation follows being)
summarized how the nature of the human subject prompts and dictates their action. The
extension of humans sharing divine being in this actualization phase of creativity renders
concretization of the being. Due to subject-object interactions causing change, operari
sequitur esse offers humans a substantial amount of control over their ontology as well as
the world around them. Despite human dependency on God for the materials of their
artwork and the limitedness of their nature, the co-nature and co-vision experienced in
imagination culminates here in actualizing creativity as co-creation.
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CHAPTER 3: THE BRIDGE TO RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Previously, I stated that religious experience and artistic creativity need not be
separate endeavors. As such, my goal for this chapter is to answer what it is that unites
artistic creativity to religious experience in order to validate my claim. I argue that it is
the ontological nature of the human person that unites people and I suggest two themes
can demonstrate this. Then I offer a few tensions that remain between religion, art, and
theology. Lastly, I suggest Yves Klein’s artistic journey can illustrate how we might
resolve some of this tension by creating a relationship between these subjects.
Thematically, two key concepts from my previous chapters are significant to
commonalities amidst human ontological nature: limits and intensity.

Limits and

intensity are particularly applicable to religious experience as Sandra Schneiders details
that term. She attempts to argue in favor of religion as an appropriate context for
spirituality. 90 Her perspective is, “The great religions of the world are much more
adequate matrices for spiritual development and practice than personally constructed
amalgams of belief and practices.” 91 One often claimed rationalization of forsaking
religion is the confining nature of its ideological boundaries. 92 People want to, “grow
personally with freedom of spirit and openness to all that is good and useful, whatever its
source.” 93 However, she counters with reasons such as: nebulous beliefs resulting from
ungrounded framework, mistakes in truth due to no accountability, lethargy due to
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personal non-compliance, and isolation from the benefits of compiled experience, as
negative aspects of personal spiritualties devoid of any religious affiliation. 94
To distinguish how she suspects “spirituality” and “religious” contrast, she
defines spirituality as an experience, “a personal lived reality which has both active and
passive dimensions,” 95 it is a “dimension of human being which is actualized as a life
project and practice.” 96 Religion on the other hand involves, “a recognition of the total
dependence of the creature on the source or matrix of being and life which gives rise to
attitudes and actions and a reliance on the transcendent for help in living and dying.” 97
As I interpret Schneiders, to consider ones spirituality as religious experience
requires limiting ones self to spiritual traditions, institutional formation, and specific
communal influence. 98 We could say that it limits an individual’s imagination and
creativity given all that the world has to offer. We recall that May’s point of view I
offered in chapters one and two were how limits keep the imagination from causing too
much anxiety and limits maintain the true definition of creativity through selection and
actualization. May uses the metaphor of a river to describe the cause of limits, he writes,
“Limits are as necessary as those provided by the banks of a river, without which the
water would be dispersed on the earth and there would be no river—that is, the river is
constituted by the tension between flowing water and the banks.” 99 From this metaphor
we observe that limitation is definition and containment, which in the estimation of May
is the everyday action of selection. Religion formulates a useful selection that bounds the
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imagination and limits its focus to foster creative output. The everyday experience of
artists limiting themselves through their creative selections is no less expected in the
arena of religious experience.

As May’s limitation concept has as just illustrated,

Schneider’s viewpoint has merit; religion perceived as spiritual limitation is not realistic
rationale. Indeed May proclaims, “Conflict presupposes limit and the struggle with limits
is actually the source of creative productions.” 100
The second theme that Schneiders conveys for us is that of a commitment to a
religious practice.

As May informed us in previous chapters, the commitment of

intensity brings us closer to unity. As was the case with limits, intensity is no less
required in the practice of artistry than it is in formal religion. Since the rigor of intense
committed action absorbs and formulates the self, Schneiders’ comparable sentiment of,
“only the rootedness of religious commitment in tradition can equip us for the kind of
inter-religious participation which will further the unity of the human family,” 101 seems
reasonable given the same necessary parameters required of artists. In the same way that
numerous artistic collaborators must be united with and committed to the same vision for
a creative project, the same concentration of engagement toward spiritual matters will
unite the human family. By placing in conversation these relevant concepts of May and
Schneiders, I have suggested a final step for art as, “a kind of bridge to religious
experience.”
However, composing “a kind of bridge to religious experience” as a theology of
imagination and creativity creates tensions.

When attempting to create a dialogue

between art and theology artists and theologians, three challenges arise.
100
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articulate religious experience in theological language could appear to replace religious
experience with theology. Second, articulating artistic creativity as religious experience
could defeat the familiarity with which art and artistry was meant to accomplish. The
third challenge is to explain imagining and crafting as religious experience when
religious affiliation is diminishing.

We recall JPII’s concern in his Letter of an

atmosphere of religious apathy and hostility. Perhaps in light of this, he remarks, “There
is a ‘spirituality’ of artistic service.” 102 According to Sandra M. Schneiders, spirituality
currently enjoys a high profile, and people claiming affiliation to that concept are on the
rise, while religious affiliation is diminishing. 103 I will conclude this final construction of
a bridge to religious experience by relating and differentiating religious experience with
theology and spirituality, and discussing how art participates in these manifestations.
To introduce the tension between theology and religious experience, Viladesau
says “If systematic theological language is usually not of the same kind as language of
originating religious experience, this is because it performs a special function with regard
to the latter: it is a second-order language that distances itself in order to reflect critically
on experience.” 104 Religious experience expresses itself through theology. In certain
instances theology does inspire religious experience. However, theology is not a means
in and of itself because theology is first and foremost a reaction to religious experience.
Theology is the attempt to articulate religious experience. Ultimately, theology is meant
to be lived. Philip Sheldrake says that theology is more than an analytical method, the
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spiritual lives of people can test theology’s rigor with intensity and honesty. 105 He also
provides for us a glimpse of how theology should be accountable to religious experience
precisely because its reputation is that it is not:
The emphasis on the experiential in spirituality has tended to reinforce a
sense that spirituality is fundamentally detached from “doing theology”.
Conversely, it suggests that theology is purely theoretical and has nothing
to do with life. “Doing theology” theologically is ultimately a form of
spiritual practice and this is a different kind of exercise from an outside-in
analysis of Christian religion. This is why I suggest that theology in its
fullest sense involves a way of life—becoming a theological person. 106
What Sheldrake is formulating is that theology must honestly admit that its
language cannot be the only mode of religious expression. 107 In this way,
although my prime representative of faith in this thesis is a theologian, by no
means are they the only ones who need, participate in, or express religious
experience.
As we explored in chapter one, art as an aesthetic is experiential. Art is a source
for theology and an alternative expression to theology. Furthermore the Roman Catholic
religious experience is grounded in sensible aesthetic experience. What I have argued in
this thesis is that due to ontological nature a human artist is like God as an artist. In
chapter two, I illustrated how subject–object interaction impacts ontology during the
creative process. What artwork is made for aesthetic viewing is both a response to
something the artist first beheld in the ontology of creation and a manifestation of the
artist’s ontology. In this way, a viewer experiences more than one author in a work. This
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is why I argued that phases five and nine are closely linked. What Viladesau can tell us
further is that,
The realm of aesthetic experience may serve as a source for systematic
theological reflection in at least two ways. First, it is a locus of explicitly
religious (and theological) experience, expression, and discourse; second,
it is a locus of secular human experience that is either (a) “implicitly”
religious or (b) susceptible to correlation with the sacred. 108
On the other hand, Sheldrake and I disagree with Viladesau’s final statement because
secular human experience may be the sacred unrecognized.

I share Sheldrake’s

sentiment: “Christian theology radically reconfigures human conceptions of the sacred.
No part of the material world or of human activity is inherently profane although it may
be profaned by sinful human action. The everyday world is an authentic theological
locus.” 109
Author of Imagining God Garrett Green can suggest positive and negative
implications with respect to imagination and its relationship to theology and religion. He
suggests that religious individuals have long avoided adopting imagination due to the
suspicion that religion uses God as an illusion to control people. 110 From a more positive
perspective he says, “If imagination is the human ability to perceive and represent
likeness, religions employ that ability rendering the world accessible to the imagination
in such a way that its ultimate nature, value, and destiny are made manifest.” 111 In this
way religion has imagination at its service. It is therefore integral for Green to draw the
conclusion that the fact versus fiction attitude toward imagination is inadequate; just
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because imagination is imaginative, does not mean it is imaginary. 112 How Green applies
this to theology is to say, “The long doctrinal tradition of interpreting the imago dei can
be reformulated, without doing violence to its meaning, as a theology of the human
imagination.” 113 Evidently, Green encourages theologians to consider fostering the
relationship between theologians and artists united in the name of imagination in order to
formulate practical theology as he aptly observes, “All too often the practical tasks of the
church have either been ignored by systematic theology or artificially tacked onto as an
afterthought.” 114
To create a “bridge to religious experience”, this chapter built upon the first two,
to say that the ontological nature of humans unite them together. Therefore religious
experience and artistic creativity share at least two common themes: limitation and
intensity.

Contrary to the individualistic and often eclectic nature of “spirituality”

religion creates boundaries and limits imagination so a person can be more creative.
Intense religious commitment when practiced by many unites the human family through a
common vision. Although theology attempts to articulate religious experiences it should
be lived and practical. Art is a source for theology but it is also an alternative expression
of it, a theology spoken without words. This being the case, imagination can serve
religion because our imago dei makes a theology of imagination and creativity possible.
In the following chapter I suggest French Artist Yves Klein exemplifies my case. He was
a devout Roman Catholic who had a vibrant spirituality that is easily excavated for
theological concepts that articulate religious experience that can unite conversation
between the theologian and the artist.
112
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CHAPTER 4: IMAGINATION & CREATIVITY
IN THE ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE OF YVES KLEIN
Until this point, I have written generally about theological elements that
contribute to the artistic process of Imagination and Creativity. I aspire with this chapter
to present the artistic experience of French artist Yves Klein as a case study that
demonstrates this thesis. In a sense, Klein was an artist/theologian who embodied the
dialogue JPII promotes in his Letter between artists and theologians. The life of Yves
Klein represents art as a bridge to religious experience.
Klein believed there was, “the excessively spiritual region of artistic creation.”115
Yet more than a spiritual artist he was a devoutly religious person who sought to
articulate in his artistry his experience of divinity. His opinions about “the void” and
“space” often served as metaphors for God, “You do not understand, the more dimension,
the more divine, the more nothingness, the more divine, but inconceivably, we refuse,
foolish as we are, to see and contemplate it and to make use of it because it burns
reason.” 116 He was an active member of the Knights of the Order of Saint Sebastian. 117
He also frequently wrote prayers to St. Rita of Cascia. 118 On one occasion he expressed
his religious fervor by leaving upon her altar a small box of plexi glass filled with blue
and pink dry pigments and gold leafing, inside a hand written note asked humbly for her
to pray for him. 119
While he was not always so publically candid about religion with formally
religious language, he admitted that the more he painted the more he understood that he
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was, “a true Christian.” 120 He said that with artistic creation, “I am returning to Eden. I
am certain of it.” 121 He once compared breaking his isolation from inside his studio by
the act of inviting models to create with him to Heb 9:8-9 and Matt 27:51 when he said,
“I wanted to tear away the veil from the temple of the studio.” 122 In another instance he
said poignantly, “Like Christ, the painter says Mass by painting and gives the body of his
soul as nourishment to others; he brings about, on a miniature scale, the miracle of the
Holy Communion in each painting.” 123 Aside from these instances however, much of his
career was spent doing his artistry as theology. He had strong and hopeful convictions in
a “Blue Revolution”. By this peaceful revolution, France would become beautiful, and
holy because everyone would follow the will of God to bring about the greatest culture
the world had ever seen. 124
In phase five, the aesthetic of the created world, humans encounter existing things
in the world that act as catalysts to spark the creative process of imagination. This was
indeed the case with Klein. In April 1947, at the age of twenty, Klein was laying on the
beach in Nice, looking up at the blue sky. This moment is cited by Kerry Brougher as
providing the inspiration that would initiate his fifteen-year artistic journey. 125 As is the
case for many artists, the ontological essence of nature inspires creative action in a
moment of aesthetic voyeurism. In 1961, published in the magazine ZERO, a photograph
taken by Klein entitled The Sky Above Nice, seems to document this inaugural
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moment. 126 He is quoted by his friend at the time, Arman, as having said, “the blue sky
is my first artwork.” 127
His artistic talent would far exceed photography, his larger scheme would
consume the duration of his career, and it began primarily with a purposeful use of color.
He would detail his intentions in a book he published called The Monochrome Adventure
(Monochrome). A monochrome is an artwork in a single color, though perhaps utilizing
various shades of that color. The color Klein would select and affiliate with was blue.
He would call his own particular shade, a vibrant ultramarine, International Klein Blue
(IKB). 128 Klein says of his work, “I painted monochrome surfaces to see, with my own
eyes to SEE, what was visible in the absolute.” 129 I interpret Klein’s use of “the
absolute” to indicate the ontological reality of which I have written. Klein aptly observed
that color is not a human creation, it is an ontological existence to be pondered and
utilized, “Color ‘is’. It is a presence already in itself that can be charged by the artist with
a particular life, bringing its presence within reach of the human sensibility.” 130 Klein
was purposeful and forward in his thinking, beyond his own experience as artist, he was
concerned with phase nine, the aesthetics of his own artwork, and he allowed that to
influence and dictate his work.
What led him to the artistic attempt, “where color becomes full and pure
sensibility” 131 was the belief that humans could in fact sensibly perceive the essence of
color’s immateriality. Klein believed, “Nature is more than just physical and material, far
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from it, far from it! If nature, in artistic creations, was only what we perceived by our
five senses, we would be rather wretched creatures on earth and in the universe.” 132
Given Klein’s disposition that there was more to be seen in nature, as exemplified in his
presentations of mere color, he envisioned a new potential for the art of painting,
“Painting no longer appeared to me to be functionally related to the eye.” 133 Having
already given up on lines and forms to convey essence because, “paintings, of whatever
kind, abstract or representational, have the effect of the bars on a prison window,” 134
Klein would attempt to rely on color alone so as to assert that, “there exists a sensuous
and colored matter that is intangible it is no longer a question of seeing color but rather of
‘perceiving’ it.” 135
His artistic endeavor that illustrates his attempt to depict this absolute, ontological,
and immaterial essence was as follows: in two separate gallery exhibits, he created ten
and eleven paintings of ultramarine monochrome, almost identical in format, size,
proportion, tone, and value and on the second occasion priced them very differently. 136
Klein details in Monochrome the negative outcome of his first attempt: “Unfortunately,
this occasion made apparent that many spectators were slaves to their manner of
seeing.” 137

His second attempt was better received when people purchased these

paintings that appeared the same but which Klein insisted had different essences that
demanded differing prices. He mused, “This demonstrated, on the one hand, the pictorial
quality of each painting was perceptible by something other than the material and
132

Yves Klein, “How and Why in 1957,” Overcoming the Problematics of Art and Writings, 388, quoted in
Denys Riout, Yves Klein Expressing the Immaterial (Paris: Éditions Dilecta, 2010), 47.
133
Yves Klein, “Chelsea Hotel Manifesto” in YKW, 198.
134
Yves Klein, “Overcoming the Problematics of Art” in YKW, 46.
135
Yves Klein, “My Position in the Battle Between Line and Color” in YKW, 20-21.
136
Ibid., 19-20.
137
Ibid., 20.

A Theology of Imagination and Creativity

48

Huseby

physical appearance and, on the other, that those who made their choice recognized that
state to which I refer as ‘Pictorial Sensibility’.” 138
This unique art by Yves Klein demonstrated among other things, the place
between imagination and creativity. These paintings were intentionally crafted short of
the full actualization of creativity. As Klein exhibited in nearly identical objects what I
liken to Aquinas’ essence, the differing essences were never fully brought to existence
tangibly. In other words, rather than create objects that invited people in through that
medium; it was as though Klein invited people into his phase of imagination, where
essence had been conceived, but not fully actualized. This is perhaps what motivates
Brougher to comment on Klein, “Painting was a means for transporting Klein himself
into the air and beyond. The many flights he made convinced him that art could change
the world; upon his occasional returns to earth, he brought with him new concepts for
nothing less than the ‘total freedom of mind and body’.” 139 I suggest this “air and
beyond” is the realm of imaginative concepts or essence. Klein seemed aware of this
state between essence and actualization, imagination and creativity, and therefore
employed it. He notes the time it took for his color revelation to come to fruition,
recalling painting with color as a nineteen-year-old, “I would not consider at the time
these attempts as having pictorial potential until one year later when the archetype of a
new state of things is ready, that it has ripened, that it can be brought forth into the
world.” 140
This leads to the legitimate question and answer presented to us by Brougher:
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Was Klein a painter or not? Klein was indeed a painter, [he] did not
choose to be a painter; rather, he painted because he needed to create an
earthly element for us to behold in the hope that these poor substitutes for
the immaterial sensibility, these conventional objects, would under the
right circumstances, transport us beyond their material states. The only
way to accomplish Klein’s mission was to be a painter. 141
I agree with Brougher’s assessment that Klein wanted to be both more and less
than a painter:
His desire was to reinvent art as a positive activity with a renewed social
and spiritual underpinning. He was in a tug of war between art’s past and
future, between being a producer of objects in order to establish that he
was indeed an artist and being a kind of artist-sorcerer with an act
requiring no props. To be considered an artist, one had to paint; but to
dematerialize art, to make it part of a grand adventure that redefined the
very reason for art’s existence, one had not to paint. 142
Klein articulates this paradox for himself, and like JPII, seems to identify himself
as a “craftsman”:
So I am in search of the real value of the painting, the one that makes two
paintings that are absolutely identical in all visible and legible effects,
such as lines, colors, drawing, forms, size, thickness of paint, and
technique in general, but the one is painted by a “painter” and the other by
a skilled “technician”, a “craftsman” despite the fact that both are
officially recognized as “painters” by the public. This invisible real value
means that one of these objects is a “painting” and the other is not. 143
Klein saw his job as artist as more than putting paint on canvas, it was to convey an
invisible essence, an ontological reality. While a “painter” applies paint to a canvas, a
true “craftsman” in performing the same action achieves the ability to convey ontology in
the art. In this manner Klein re-defines more than the artist as a kind of theologian, he
illustrates a painting as possessing an ontological essence.
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I have argued in chapter one that the essence contained in an artwork, such as a
painting, includes the original ontology of the materials and any subsequent ontology
instilled from the contributing artist(s). There is evidence to support that Klein held a
similar belief. He speaks of the artist’s ability to place their being in a work, “The
essential of a painting is that ‘something,’ that etheric glue, that intermediary product
which the artist exudes with all his creative being and which he has the power to place, to
inlay, to impregnate in the pictorial manner of the painting.” 144 He also states more
bluntly his view of the inevitable outcome, “Painters should resemble their paintings,
which end up becoming stand-ins for them.” 145 Furthermore, within his vision of what
painting truly is and how it will transpire in the future, color acts as an equalizer to aid in
the true manifestation of the subjective ontology of the artist, “I believe that in the future
one will paint canvases in only one single color at a time and with nothing other than the
color. Contrary to what is believed, there will be a good deal of variety, and certain
painters will never manage to produce beautiful colors, whereas others will produce
paintings that are ravishing and profound.” 146 This passage from Klein implies beyond a
doubt his conviction that a painting not only contains the essence of an artist but also
their subjectivity contributes to its beauty and profundity.
While he may not suggest directly, I suspect that implied in his thoughts and
words was a kind of co-creation in collaboration with objects and perhaps even divine
being, “So I paint the pictorial moment that is born of an illumination by impregnation in
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life itself.” 147 I suspect Klein is here also implying that what was required was a kind of
co-vision necessary to accomplish his work. He also wrote, “I am for both an extreme
individualism and for a total depersonalization, which may seem paradoxical but, in the
final analysis, is not so if one tries hard to think in terms of sensibility means ‘life
itself’.” 148 I interpret Klein to mean that an artwork can both assert and contain the
subjectivity of an artist while likewise maintaining the objectivity of the original object
transformed. His proposal of the extremes of each, individualism and depersonalization,
may aid us in ultimately realizing the balance necessary between the two, because one
without the other seems incorrect. He proclaimed, “true painters paint their presence and
the sole fact that they exist as such is their great and unique work. And there, truly, one
returns to, or rather, there one attains the masterpiece, constantly: himself.” 149
In one respect, Klein wanted to give others the same experience he had of color,
but in order to do so he needed to attempt to re-enact phase four in phase 8. He would
need to eliminate as much as possible phases 5 to 8 from the process so as to have phases
4 and 9 match as much as possible. While I would argue that this is nearly impossible, it
is foundational in understanding how I draw the parallel between Klein’s receptivity and
his audience receptivity. Denys Riout observes in those who experienced Klein’s work,
“This—real—presence can have an effect on the art lover provided that he show himself
to be receptive enough to give it a chance to express itself." 150 Klein was keenly aware
that what he observed in color is what he attempted to convey to his audience if only they
remained receptive. In response to the “Monochrome Propositions” exhibit at that time,
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Bernadette Allain comments on the receptivity inherent in Klein’s work, “But, more
importantly and dangerously, each color summons you. There comes a moment when it
beckons you, and you stop. Its world is calling you; and if you are receptive to it, it
imposes itself on you.” 151 It can be argued I think that given the natural and pure nature
of color, this receptivity of color applies to phases five and nine where color was
observed by Klein in the created world and then later in his created art.
Up until this point, the main theme I have been working with is ontology. We
likened what humans do in the aesthetic of the creative world with Rollo May’s notion of
encounter. His second concept for the creative process is intensity.

As Klein can

indicate for us, since intensity arises in an act of seeing, it can occur in both phases five
and nine. To May, intensity in the creative process speaks to the depth and commitment
with which an artist (or viewer) is willing to go. I propose that it was Klein’s intensity in
his moment of aesthetic beholding of the ontology of the created world, which allowed
him to see in color what no other artist had seen with such simple clarity. As Klein is
trying to re-enact his own viewership this same intensity is then asked of the viewer. In
speaking of Klein’s exhibit, his friend and artistic supporter Restany is quoted as saying,
“The artist here requests of the spectator this intense and fundamental moment of
truth. 152” Klein spoke for himself through Allain as having said, “I appeal to the observer
placed in front of my works to be willing to abstract the monochrome canvas from
everything that effectively surrounds it. In that way he can be immersed in the color, and

151

Bernadette Allain, “Monochrome Propositions by the Artist Yves Klein,” Colors 18 (December 1956),
25-27, quoted in Klaus Ottmann, Yves Klein by Himself: His Life and Thought (Paris: Éditions Dilecta,
2010), 401.
152
Pierre Restany, Yves Klein (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1982), 23-24, quoted in Kerry Brougher,
“Involuntary Painting” in Yves Klein: With the Void, Full Powers ed. by Kerry Brougher (Washington
D.C.: Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden/Walker Center, 2010), 25-26.

A Theology of Imagination and Creativity

53

Huseby

the color immerses itself in him, and, perhaps, he can enter into the world of color. To
clarify, the intensity of the contemplation of color in itself is superior to any observation
or even mere contemplation of a simple color relation.” 153 Brougher’s present day
comment notes this as well, “The irony of Klein’s use of the monochrome is that rather
than requiring less of the viewer, it requires more. The monochrome invites the viewer to
first concentrate on his or her optical perceptions to a heightened degree not necessitated
by representational painting.” 154
More than conscious of what his actions were, Klein was conscious that he was
acting, “Through the act of painting the walls white, I desire, by this act, not only to
purify the setting, but also, and above all, by this action and gesture, momentarily to
make it into my space for work and creation.” 155 According to Nicolas Bourriaud, Klein
was a philosopher of action, “a creator of exemplary actions, more so than a manufacturer
of objects or images.” 156
This chapter has aimed to demonstrate that the artistic work and rhetoric of Yves
Klein demonstrates some of the theological themes addressed in this thesis, namely
ontology. Klein showed us the moment of encounter as being important to his inspiration,
the ontological nature of color and paintings. As an artist, he was also a theologian. He
was a self-proclaimed “craftsman” who worked in the in-between of imagination and
creativity, essence and existence. He demonstrated intensity in the midst of subjectobject interaction for the sake of co-creation.
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CONCLUSION
JPII had a vision for a renewed dialogue between artists and theologians. If the
experiences of each could contribute their perception of reality they could blend their
experiences into a practical framework.

To the question: Can the human acts of

imagination and creativity be a legitimate bridge to religious experience? The answer is
yes. Through ontology and phenomenology humans are capacitated to act in the imago
dei. By utilizing this imago dei people can bring essences into existence in the acts of
imagination and creativity.

The process of encounter, selection as limitation,

actualization, and intensity in the vision allows someone to traverse the bridge to
religious experience during the acts of imagination and creativity. Participation in conature, co-vision, and collaborative action, allows humans to enjoy co-creation with God.
This artistic process is challenging to articulate in a theological context because it
must remain authentic and honest to both the artist and the theologian. Art is a source for
theology but it is also a different expression of it. Yves Klein embodied a conversation
between artist and theologian, between spiritual and religious. Primarily, the ontological
essence of color figured centrally into his career. His hope of the “Blue Revolution” was
not too unlike that of Sandra Schneider’s, where intense religious commitment practiced
by many unites the human family in a common vision.
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